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Abstract— We consider an attacker-operator game for mon-
itoring a large-scale network that is comprised on components
that differ in their criticality levels. In this zero-sum game,
the operator seeks to position a limited number of sensors
to monitor the network against an attacker who strategically
targets a network component. The operator (resp. attacker)
seeks to minimize (resp. maximize) the network loss. To study
the properties of mixed-strategy Nash Equilibria of this game,
we first study two simple instances: (i) When component sets
monitored by individual sensor locations are mutually disjoint;
(ii) When only a single sensor is positioned, but with possibly
overlapping monitoring component sets. Our analysis reveals
new insights on how criticality levels impact the players equilib-
rium strategies. Next, we extend a previously known approach
to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for the general
case of the game. This approach uses solutions to minimum
set cover and maximum set packing problems to construct an
approximate Nash equilibrium. Finally, we implement a column
generation procedure to improve this solution and numerically
evaluate the performance of our approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Critical infrastructure networks such as water distribu-
tion or power networks are attractive targets for malicious
attackers [1], [2]. In fact, successful attacks against these
networks have already been documented [3], [4], amplifying
the need for development of effective defense strategies. An
important part of a defense strategy is attack detection [5],
which can be achieved by deployment of sensors to monitor
the network [6]–[8]. However, if a network is large, it is
expected that the number of sensors would be insufficient to
enable monitoring of the entire network. Hence, the problem
that naturally arises is how to strategically allocate a limited
number of sensors in that case.
We adopt a game theoretic approach to tackle this problem.
So far, game theory has been used for studying various
security related problems [9]–[15], including the ones on
sensor allocation. The existing works considered developing
both static [16]–[18] and randomized (mixed) monitoring
strategies [7], [8]. Our focus is on randomized strategies,
which are recognized to be more effective than static once
the number of sensors to deploy is limited [7], [8].
Our game model is related to the one in [7]. The network
consists of the components to be monitored, and sensor
locations can be selected from the predefined set of nodes.
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From each node, attacks against a subset of components can
be detected. However, while [7] studies the game where the
players (the operator and the attacker) make decisions based
on so-called detection rate, in our game the decisions are
made based on the component criticality. This game model
is motivated by the risk management process, where one first
conducts a risk assessment to identify the critical components
in the system, and then allocates resources based on the
output of the assessment [5]. Particularly, the operator seeks
placing a limited number of sensors to minimize the loss
that is defined through the component criticality, while the
attacker seeks to attack a component to maximize it.
A monitoring strategy we aim to find is the one that lies
in a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game. Since our game
is a zero-sum game, a NE can be calculated by solving a
pair of linear programs [19]. However, these programs are
challenging to solve in our case, since the number of actions
of the operator grows rapidly with the number of sensors
she has at disposal. Moreover, a NE calculated using this
numerical procedure usually does not provide us with much
intuition behind the players’ equilibrium strategies. Our
objective in this work is to: (i) Study how the components’
criticality influences the equilibrium strategies of the players;
(ii) Investigate if some of the tools from [7] can be used to
calculate or approximate an equilibrium monitoring strategy
for our game in a tractable manner.
Our contributions are threefold. Firstly, for a game in-
stance where component sets monitored by individual sensor
locations are mutually disjoint, we characterize a NE ana-
lytically (Theorem 1). This result provide us with valuable
intuition behind the equilibrium strategies, and reveals some
fundamental differences compared to the game from [7]. Par-
ticularly, the result illustrates how the components’ criticality
influences strategies of the players, that the resource limited
operator can leave some of the noncritical components un-
monitored, and that the attacker does not necessarily have to
attack these components. We also consider a game instance
where a single sensor is positioned but the monitoring sets
are allowed to overlap, and extend some of the conclusions
to this case (Proposition 2).
Secondly, we show that the mixed strategies proposed
in [7] can be used to obtain an approximate NE. In this
approximate NE, the monitoring (resp. attack) strategy is
formed based on a solution to minimum set cover (resp.
maximum set packing) problem. A similar approach for
characterizing equilibria was also used in [13]–[15], yet for
specific models and player resources. Our analysis reveals
that these strategies may represent an exact or a relatively
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Fig. 1. The set of nodes (resp. components) is V={v1, . . . , v4} (resp.
E={e1, . . . , e7}). The monitoring sets are Ev1={e1, e2}, Ev2={e2, e3},
Ev3={e3, . . . , e7}, and Ev4={e5}.
good approximation of a NE if the component criticality
levels are homogeneous, while the approximation quality
decreases if the gap in between the maximum and the
minimum criticality level is large (Theorem 2).
Finally, we discuss how to improve the set cover moni-
toring strategy from the above-mentioned approximate equi-
librium. The first approach exploits the intuition from The-
orem 1. Particularly, if a group of the components have a
criticality level sufficiently larger then the others, we show
that the strategy can be improved by a simple modification
(Proposition 4). The second approach is by using a column
generation procedure (CGP) [20]. This procedure was sug-
gested in [7] as a possible way to improve the set cover
strategy, but it was not tested since the strategy already
performed well. We show that CGP can be applied in our
game as well, and test it on benchmarks of large scale water
networks. The results show that: (i) The running time of
CGP rapidly grows with the number of deployed sensors,
but the procedure can still be used for finding an equilibrium
monitoring for water networks of several hundred nodes;
(ii) Running a limited number of iterations of CGP can
considerably improve the set cover monitoring strategy.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
introduce the game. In Sections III, we discuss two special
game instances. In Sections IV, we show that the strategies
from [7] can be used to obtain an approximate NE, and
discuss how the monitoring strategy from this approximate
equilibrium can be further improved. In Section V, we test
CGP. In Section VI, we conclude.
II. GAME DESCRIPTION
Our network model considers a set of components
E={e1, . . . , em} that can be potential targets of an attacker,
and a set of nodes V={v1, . . . , vn} that can serve as sensor
positions for the purpose of monitoring. By placing a sensor
at node v, one can monitor a subset of components Ev⊆E ,
which we refer to as the monitoring set of v. Without loss
of generality, we assume Ev 6=∅, and that every component
can be monitored from at least one node. If sensors are
positioned at a subset of nodes V⊆V , then the set of
monitored components can be written as EV :=∪v∈V Ev . We
refer the reader to Fig. 1 for an illustration of monitoring sets.
To study the problem of strategic sensor allocation in the
network, we adopt a game-theoretic approach. Specifically,
we consider a zero sum game Γ=〈{1, 2}, (A1,A2), l〉, in
which Player 1 (P1) is the operator and Player 2 (P2) is the
attacker. P1 can select up to b1 nodes from V to place sensors
and monitor some of the network components from E . We
assume that these sensors are protected, in that they are not
subject to the actions of P2. P2 seeks to select a component
from E to attack. We assume that if P1 successfully detects
the attack, she can start a response mechanism to mitigate
the damage. Thus, in our model, the attack is successful only
if it remains undetected by P1. Based on the discussion, the
action set of P1 (resp. P2) is A1={V ∈2V | |V |≤b1} (resp.
A2=E). The loss function l:A1×A2−→R is defined by
l(V, e) :=
{
we, e /∈ EV ,
0, e ∈ EV ,
(1)
where we∈(0, 1] is a known constant whose value indicates
the level of criticality of the component e; the assumption
we>0 is without loss of generality. For practical purposes,
for each e∈E , we can be evaluated as the normalized
monetary loss to P1, negative impact on the overall system
functionality when the component e is compromised by P2,
or a combination of several factors. We assume that P1 (resp.
P2) seeks to minimize (resp. maximize) l.
The players are allowed to use mixed strategies. A mixed
strategy of a player is a probability distribution over the set of
her pure actions. Particularly, mixed strategies are defined as
σ1 ∈ ∆1,∆1 =
{
σ1 ∈ [0, 1]|A1|
∣∣∣∣ ∑
V ∈A1
σ1(V ) = 1
}
,
σ2 ∈ ∆2,∆2 =
{
σ2 ∈ [0, 1]|A2|
∣∣∣∣ ∑
e∈A2
σ2(e) = 1
}
,
where σ1 (resp. σ2) is a mixed strategy of P1 (resp. P2), and
σ1(V ) (resp. σ2(e)) is the probability the action V (resp. e)
is taken. One interpretation of mixed strategy σ1 for P1 is
that it provides a randomized sensing plan; similarly for P2.
For example, in a day-to-day play in which both players
play myopically, P1 (resp. P2) selects sensor placement
(resp. attack) plan according to sampling from probability
distribution σ1 (resp. σ2).
In the analysis that follows, it is convenient to charac-
terize σ1 through the marginal probabilities. The marginal
probability ρσ1(v) is given by
ρσ1(v) :=
∑
V ∈A1,v∈V
σ1(V ), (2)
and it represents the probability that a sensor is placed at v
if P1 plays σ1. Next, given (σ1,σ2)∈∆1×∆2, the expected
loss is defined by
L(σ1, σ2) :=
∑
V ∈A1
∑
e∈A2
σ1(V )σ2(e)l(V, e).
We use L(V, σ2) (resp. L(σ1, e)) to denote the case where
σ1(V )=1 (resp. σ2(e)=1) for some V ∈A1 (resp. e∈A2).
We are concerned with strategy profile(s) that represent a
NE of Γ. A strategy profile (σ∗1 ,σ
∗
2) is a NE if
L(σ∗1 , σ2) ≤ L(σ∗1 , σ∗2) ≤ L(σ1, σ∗2),
holds for all σ1∈∆1 and σ2∈∆2. We refer to L(σ∗1 , σ∗2) as
the value of the game. Thus, given that P2 plays according
to σ∗2 , P1 cannot perform better than by playing according
to randomized monitoring strategy σ∗1 . Additionally, in a
zero sum game, the value of the game is equal for every
NE. Hence, it suffices for P1 to find a single randomized
monitoring strategy that lies in equilibrium. Similar argument
holds for P2’s randomized attack strategy σ∗2 .
We say that a strategy profile (σ1, σ

2) is an –NE of Γ if
L(σ1, σ2)−  ≤ L(σ1, σ2) ≤ L(σ1, σ2) + ,  ≥ 0,
for all σ1∈∆1 and σ2∈∆2. In this case, if P2 plays according
to σ2, P1 may be able to decrease her loss by deviating
from σ1, but not more than . Thus, if  is small enough, σ

1
represents a good suboptimal strategy; similarly for P2.
Since Γ is a zero-sum game with finite number of player
actions, equilibrium strategies and the value of the game in
a NE exists, and can be obtained by solving the following
pair of linear programs [19]
(LP1) minimize
z1,σ1∈∆1
z1 subject to L(σ1, e) ≤ z1,∀e ∈ A2,
(LP2) maximize
z2,σ2∈∆2
z2 subject to L(V, σ2) ≥ z2,∀V ∈ A1.
Yet, these LPs can be computationally challenging to solve
using standard optimization solvers for realistic instances
of Γ. Namely, since the cardinality of A1 rapidly grows
with respect to b1, so does the number of variables (resp.
constraints) of LP1 (resp. LP2). In the following section, we
provide structural properties of equilibria for two simple but
instructive cases. Subsequently, we discuss an approach to
compute –NE, and then discuss how to further improve the
monitoring strategy from this –NE.
III. EXACT EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES
In this section, we first study the game instance in which
the monitoring sets are mutually disjoint. We then analyze
the game in which the monitoring sets can overlap with each
other, but P1 can only use a single sensor (b1=1).
A. Mutually Disjoint Monitoring Sets
We first derive a NE for an instance of Γ where the mon-
itoring sets are mutually disjoint, that is, Evi∩Evj=∅ holds
for any two nodes vi 6=vj . Let e∗i denote the component from
Evi with the largest criticality we∗i . One can identify such
a component for each of the monitoring sets, and assume
without loss of generality we∗1≥. . .≥we∗n . For given b1, we
define Z(b1) as follows:
Z(b1) =
{
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
∣∣∣∣ j − b1∑j
i=1 1/we∗i
≤ we∗j
}
. (3)
We argue that this set determines nodes on which P1 places
sensors in a NE. Particularly, let p be the largest element of
Z(b1), Ep={e∗1, . . . , e∗p}, Sp=
∑p
i=1 1/we∗i , and (σ
∗
1 , σ
∗
2) be
a strategy profile that satisfies the following conditions:
ρσ∗1 (vj) =
{
1− p−b1we∗
j
Sp
, j ≤ p,
0, j > p,
(4)
σ∗2(e) =
{
1
w∗eSp
, e ∈ Ep,
0, otherwise.
(5)
Lemma 1 establishes existence of (σ∗1 , σ
∗
2). In Theorem 1,
we show that this strategy profile is a NE.
Lemma 1: There exists at least one strategy profile
(σ∗1 , σ
∗
2) that satisfies (4)–(5).
Proof: To prove existence of σ∗1 , we need to prove:
(i) ρσ∗1 (v)∈[0, 1] for any v∈V; (ii)
∑
v∈V ρσ∗1 (v)=b1. If (i)
and (ii) are satisfied, then σ∗1∈∆1 from Farkas lemma (see
Lemma EC.6. [7]).
We begin by proving (i). Note that b1∈Z(b1), so p≥b1.
Then p−b1we∗
j
Sp
≥0, which implies ρσ∗1 (v)≤1 for any v∈V .
From we∗1≥. . .≥we∗p and (3), we have p−b1we∗1Sp≤. . .≤
p−b1
we∗pSp
≤1.
Hence, 0≤ρσ∗1 (v) must hold for any v∈V . Thus, (i) is
satisfied. In addition, we have∑
v∈V
ρσ∗1 (v)
(4)
= p− p− b1
Sp
p∑
i=1
1
w∗ei
= b1,
so (ii) holds as well. Thus, σ∗1∈∆1.
Next, we show σ∗2∈∆2. Firstly, we have from (5) that
0≤σ∗2(e)≤1 for any e∈E . Moreover,∑
e∈E
σ∗2(e)
(5)
=
1
Sp
∑
e∈Ep
1
w∗e
= 1,
so we conclude σ∗2∈∆2.
Theorem 1: If Evi∩Evj=∅ holds for any two nodes
vi 6=vj from V , then any strategy profile (σ∗1 , σ∗2) that sat-
isfies (4)–(5) is a NE of Γ.
Proof: Let (σ∗1 , σ
∗
2) be a strategy profile that satis-
fies (4)–(5). We know from Lemma 1 that at least one such a
profile exists. We first derive an upper bound on the expected
loss if P1 plays σ∗1 . Assume P2 targets component e that
belongs to Evj , j ≤ p. Then
L(σ∗1 , e) =
∑
V ∈A1
σ∗1(V )l(V, e) =
∑
V ∈A1,e/∈EV
σ∗1(V )we
= we
∑
V ∈A1,vj /∈V
σ∗1(V )
(2)
= we(1− ρσ∗1 (vj))
(4)
=
we
we∗j
p− b1
Sp
(∗)
≤ p− b1
Sp
,
(6)
where (*) follows from the fact that we∗j is the largest critical-
ity among the components from Evj . If p=n, we established
that p−b1Sp is an upper bound on P1’s loss. If p<n, there
exist nodes that are never selected for sensor positioning, so
the components from Evp+1 , . . . ,Evn are never monitored.
From (1), by targeting an unmonitored component el, P2
can achieve the payoff wel . Note that wel cannot be larger
than we∗p+1 , because we∗p+1 is the largest criticality for the
monitoring set Evp+1 , and we∗p+1 ≥ . . . ≥ we∗n holds for the
remaining sets Evp+2 , . . . , Evn . Since p+ 1 does not belong
to Z(b1), it follows from (3)
we∗p+1 <
p+ 1− b1
Sp + 1/we∗p+1
⇐⇒ we∗p+1Sp < p− b1.
Thus, the loss associated with any unmonitored component
el is upper bounded by L(σ∗1 , el)≤we∗p+1<p−b1Sp . From the
later observation and (6), we conclude that the loss of P1
cannot be larger than p−b1Sp .
Consider now σ∗2 . For any V , such that |V | ≤ b1, we have
L(V, σ∗2) =
∑
e∈A2
σ∗2(e)l(V, e) =
p∑
i=1,e∗i /∈EV
σ∗2(e
∗
i )we∗i
(5)
=
p∑
i=1,e∗i /∈EV
1/we∗i
Sp
we∗i =
p∑
i=1,e∗i /∈EV
1
Sp
(∗∗)
≥ p− b1
Sp
,
where (**) follows from the fact that every component e∗i
belongs to a different monitoring set, so at most b1 of them
can be monitored by placing sensors at nodes V . Thus, we
can conclude that p−b1Sp is the value of the game, and (σ
∗
1 , σ
∗
2)
is a NE of Γ.
We now discuss P1’s equilibrium strategy. From (4), we
see that the probability of P1 placing a sensor at node vj
depends on the corresponding maximum criticality we∗j : the
higher we∗j is, the higher the probability of placing a sensor
at vj is. This is intuitive because P1 monitors more critical
components with higher probability. Additionally, note that
P1 places sensors only on the first p nodes. If p<n, nodes
vp+1, . . . , vn are never allocated any sensor, and hence,
the components from Evp+1 , . . . , Evn are never monitored.
This is in contrast with the result from [7], where it was
shown that P1 monitors every component with non-zero
probability in any NE. Indeed, in our proof, we show that
the unmonitored components have criticality lower than the
value of the game. Another interesting observation is that the
set of nodes on which sensors are allocated also depends on
the number of sensors P1 has at her disposal. Particularly,
the more sensors P1 has, on the more nodes she allocates
sensors, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Let b1∈N (resp. b′1∈N) be given, and p
(resp. p′) be the largest element of Z(b1) (resp. Z(b′1)). If
b1<b
′
1≤ n, then p≤p′.
Proof: Note that p (resp. p′) exists, since b1∈Z(b1)
(resp. b′1∈Z(b′1)). We then have
we∗p
(3)
≥ p− b1
Sp
(∗)
>
p− b′1
Sp
,
where (*) holds because b1<b′1. Hence, p∈Z(b′1). Since p′
is the largest element of Z(b′1), p
′ ≥ p must hold.
We now discuss P2’s equilibrium strategy. Firstly, it fol-
lows from (5) that P2 targets only the components from
Ep. Thus, the unmonitored components are not necessarily
targeted in equilibrium, again in contrast to [7]. Indeed, P2
on average gains more by attacking components from Ep,
even though they may be monitored by P1 with a non-
zero probability. Next, observe that the components from
Ep with higher criticality are targeted with lower probability.
The reason is that P1 monitors high criticality components
with higher probability, which results in P2 targeting these
components with a lower probability to remain undetected.
Finally, note that the number of components P2 attacks is
non-decreasing with the number of sensors P1 decides to
deploy; this follows from Proposition 1.
B. Overlapping Monitoring Sets and Single Sensor
To better understand if some of the conclusions from
Section III-A can be extended to the case of overlapping
monitoring sets, we discuss the case of single sensor (b1=1).
We introduce the following primal and dual linear programs
that characterize the equilibrium for this game instance:
(P) maximize
x≥0
∑
v∈V
xv subject to
∑
v∈V
e/∈Ev
xv ≤ 1
we
,∀e ∈ E ,
(D) minimize
y≥0
∑
e∈E
ye
we
subject to
∑
e∈E
e/∈Ev
ye≥ 1,∀v ∈ V.
These problems are reformulations of LP1 and LP2 [19,
Section 2]. Under the reasonable assumption that P1 cannot
monitor all the components using a single sensor, (P) and
(D) are bounded. Moreover, thanks to strong duality, their
optimal values coincide. Let x∗ be a solution of (P), y∗
be a solution of (D), and J∗ be the optimal value of these
programs. Then the following strategy profile
σ¯∗1(v) =
x∗v
J∗
, σ¯∗2(e) =
y∗e
J∗we
, (7)
is a NE of Γ.
Proposition 2: Let b1=1, and assume that Ev 6=E for any
v ∈ V . The strategy profile (7) is a NE of Γ, and the value
of the game is L(σ¯∗1 , σ¯
∗
2) =
1
J∗ .
Proof: If Ev 6=E for any v∈V , then (D) is feasible.
For example, ye1=. . .=yem=1 represents a feasible solution
of (D). Thus, J∗ is bounded and the strategy profile (7) is
well-defined. Now, for any e∈E , we have
L(σ¯∗1 , e) =
∑
v∈V
σ¯∗1(v)l(v, e)
(1),(7)
=
we
J∗
∑
v∈V,e/∈Ev
x∗v.
Note that we
∑
v∈V,e/∈Ev x
∗
v≤1, since x∗ is a solution of (P).
Thus, L(σ¯∗1 , e)≤ 1J∗ for any e∈E . Similarly, for any v∈V
L(v, σ¯∗2) =
∑
e∈E
σ¯∗2(e)l(v, e)
(1),(7)
=
∑
e∈E,e/∈Ev
y∗e
J∗
,
where
∑
e∈E,e/∈Evy
∗
e≥1 since y∗ is a solution of (D). Thus,
L(v, σ¯∗2) ≥ 1J∗ for any v ∈ V . Hence, 1J∗ is the value of the
game, and (σ¯∗1 , σ¯
∗
2) is a NE.
To understand P1’s equilibrium strategy, note that x∗v
can be viewed as a scaled probability of inspecting v. By
inserting x∗ into the constraints of (P), and dividing them
by J∗, we obtain
∑
v∈V,e/∈Ev
x∗v
J∗≤ 1weL(σ¯∗1 , σ¯∗2),∀e ∈ E . One
can now verify that the left side of this inequality is the
probability of not monitoring e. Thus, if we≤L(σ¯∗1 , σ¯∗2), then
P1 can leave e unmonitored. Otherwise, P1 monitors e with
non–zero probability. Additionally, the higher we enforces
the lower probability that e is left unmonitored. Note that all
these observations are similar to the ones we made for the
case discussed in Section III-A.
In P2’s equilibrium strategy, y∗e can be interpreted as
the scaled gain that P2 achieves by targeting e. Namely,
by inserting y∗ into the constraints of (D), and dividing
them by J∗, we obtain
∑
e∈E,e/∈Ev
y∗e
J∗≥L(σ¯∗1 , σ¯∗2),∀v∈V.
The left hand side of the inequality represents P2’s payoff
once P1 monitors v. Thus, the constraints of (D) guarantee
that P2’s payoff is at least 1J∗ . Next, P2’s objective is to
minimize
∑
e∈E
ye
we
, so she has more incentive to increase
ye for which the corresponding criticality we is higher.
This is consistent with the attack strategy (5), where P2
targeted the components from Ep. Additionally, assume that
the components e1 and e2 are associated with the same
value of the scaled gain, that is, ye1=ye2 . It then follows
from (7) that the component with higher criticality has the
lower probability of being targeted by P2, which is another
similarity with (5).
Although the discussion above provides us with some
game-theoretic intuition, we are unable to say more about
a NE (7) since x∗ and y∗ are unknown. In the next section,
we introduce an -NE that can give us more insights about
equilibrium strategies in the general case of the game.
IV. APPROXIMATE EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES
In this section, we show that the mixed strategies devel-
oped in [7] can be used to obtain an -NE for Γ, and discuss
possible ways to improve the monitoring strategy from this
-NE. We begin by introducing necessary preliminaries.
A. Preliminaries
We first define set packings and set covers, which are two
essential notions that we use subsequently.
Definition 1: We say that E ∈ 2E is: (1) A set packing,
if for all v ∈ V , |Ev ∩E| ≤ 1; (2) A maximum set packing,
if |E′| ≤ |E| holds for every other set packing E′.
Definition 2: We say that V ∈ 2V is: (1) A set cover, if
EV = E ; (2) A minimum set cover if |V | ≤ |V ′| holds for
every other set cover V ′.
Set packings are of interest to P2. Namely, each of the
components from a set packing needs to be monitored by a
separate sensor. Thus, by randomizing the attack over a set
packing, P2 can make it more challenging for P1 to detect
the attack. Similarly, set covers are of interest for P1. In fact,
if P1 is able to form a set cover using b1 sensors, she can
monitor all the components. In that case, Γ is easy to solve
in pure strategies, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: A pure strategy profile (V ∗, e∗) is a NE of
Γ if and only if V ∗ is a set cover and |V ∗| ≤ b1.
Proof: (⇒) The proof is by contradiction. Let (V ∗, e∗)
be a NE in which V ∗ is not a set cover. Assume first
that l(V ∗, e∗)=0. Since V ∗ is not a set cover, P2 can
attack e/∈EV ∗ . Then l(V ∗, e)=we>l(V ∗, e∗)=0, so (V ∗, e∗)
cannot be a NE. The remaining option is l(V ∗, e∗)> 0. In
this case, P1 can select to play V , e∗∈EV , and decrease the
loss to 0. Thus, (V ∗, e∗) cannot be a NE in this case either.
(⇐) If |V ∗|≤b1, then V ∗∈A1. Furthermore, if V ∗ is a
set cover, then l(V ∗, e)=0 for all e∈A2. Thus, P1 cannot
decrease the loss any further, and P2 cannot increase it, which
implies (V ∗, e∗) is a NE.
A more interesting and practically relevant situation is
one in which P1 is not able to monitor all the components
simultaneously due to limited sensing budget. Therefore, we
henceforth assume that P1 cannot form a set cover using b1
sensors; i.e. b1<|V | hold for any set cover V ∈2V .
B. Set Cover/Set Packing Based Strategies
We now introduce the mixed strategies constructed using
the notion of minimum set cover and maximum set packing.
Particularly, let V ∗ (resp. E∗) be a minimum set cover (resp.
a maximum set packing), and n∗:=|V ∗| (resp. m∗:=|E∗|).
Following [7], we consider the mixed strategies σ1 and σ

2
characterized by
ρσ1(v) =
{
b1
n∗ , v ∈ V ∗,
0, v /∈ V ∗, (8)
σ2(e) =
{
1
m∗ , e ∈ E∗,
0, e /∈ E∗. (9)
In other words, P1 places sensors only on nodes from V ∗
with probability b1n∗ . Since V
∗ is a set cover, it follows that
every component is monitored with probability at least b1n∗ .
The strategy of P2 is to attack the components from E∗
with probability 1m∗ . The proof of existence of a strategy
profile (σ1, σ

2) satisfying (8)–(9) is by construction, and
can be found in [7, Lemma 1]. Let wmin:=mine∈Ewe,
wmax:=maxe∈Ewe, and ∆w:=wmax−wmin. The following
theorem establishes that (σ1, σ

2) is an –NE, and gives the
worst case values for  and P1’s loss.
Theorem 2: Any strategy profile that satisfies (8)–(9) is
an -NE of Γ, where
 = b1wmin
n∗ −max{b1,m∗}
n∗max{b1,m∗}︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+ ∆w
n∗ − b1
n∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
=2
.
Furthermore, for any σ2∈∆2, we have
L(σ1, σ2) ≤ wmax
n∗ − b1
n∗
. (10)
Proof: We first derive an upper bound on P1’s expected
loss if she plays σ1. Let e be an arbitrary component, and
A′1={V ∈A1|l(V, e)=we} be the set of sensor placements in
which e is not monitored. The expected loss L(σ1, e) is then
L(σ1, e) =
∑
V ∈A1
σ1(V )l(V, e) = we
∑
V ∈A′1
σ1(V ).
Note that
∑
V ∈A′1 σ

1(V ) represents the probability that e is
not monitored. This probability is at most 1− b1n∗ , since P1
inspects every element of a set cover with probability b1n∗ .
Moreover, we ≤ wmax. It then follows that
L(σ1, e) ≤ wmax
n∗ − b1
n∗
= L¯, (11)
which confirms (10). We now derive a lower bound on the
expected payoff of P2 if she plays σ2. Let V be an arbitrary
element of A1, and E′={e∈E∗|l(V, e)=we} be the set of
P1    1/2 1/2 
𝑣𝑣1 𝑣𝑣2  𝑒𝑒2  𝑒𝑒3 
P2 (Best response)   1 
 𝑒𝑒1 a) 
P1 (Best response)  1 
𝑣𝑣1 𝑣𝑣2  𝑒𝑒2  𝑒𝑒3 
P2          1/2       1/2 
 𝑒𝑒1 b) 
Fig. 2. The figure illustrates why the strategies σ1 and σ

2 may fail. The
criticality of red (resp. blue) components is wmax (resp. wmin).
components from E∗ that are not monitored from V . Then
L(V, σ2) =
∑
e∈E
σ2(e)l(V, e)
(9)
=
1
m∗
∑
e∈E′
we
≥ 1
m∗
∑
e∈E′
wmin =
|E′|
m∗
wmin.
Since E∗ is a maximum set packing and |V | ≤ b1, at most b1
components can be monitored by positioning V . Therefore,
|E′| ≥ max{0,m∗ − b1}, and we conclude
L(V, σ2) ≥ wmin
max {0,m∗ − b1}
m∗
= L. (12)
From (11) and (12), it follows that L ≤ L(σ1, σ2) ≤ L¯.
Thus, (σ1, σ

2) is an -NE, where
 = L¯− L = wmaxn
∗ − b1
n∗
− wmin max {0,m
∗ − b1}
m∗
= (wmin + ∆w)
n∗ − b1
n∗
− wmin max {0,m
∗ − b1}
m∗
= b1wmin
n∗ −max{b1,m∗}
n∗max{b1,m∗} + ∆w
n∗ − b1
n∗
.
This concludes the proof.
From Theorem 2, we can draw the following conclusions.
If all the components have equal criticality level, then ∆w=0
and 2=0. In that case, 1=0 if n∗=m∗, and (σ1, σ

2) is
an exact NE. Although n∗=m∗ may look as a restrictive
condition, it turns out that n∗ and m∗ are often equal or
close to each other in practice [7]. Also note that the strategy
profile constructed using (8)–(9) differs from the equilibrium
profile developed in Section III-A in two aspects: (i) Since
V ∗ is a set cover, every component is monitored with non-
zero probability; (ii) The set of nodes where sensors are
placed (resp. the set of attacked components) does not change
with b1, that is, it is always V ∗ (resp. E∗).
However, if ∆w is large,  can be large even if n∗=m∗.
The strategies σ1 and σ

2 may fail in this case because they
assume every component to be equally critical. For instance,
consider the case from Fig. 2. We have V ∗={v1, v2},
E∗={e1, e3}, the criticality of blue (resp. red) components
is wmin (resp. wmax), and b1=1. From Fig. 2 a), we see that
P1 monitors e1 and e3 with equal probability, although they
have different criticality levels. Thus, the best response of
P2 is to target e3, which results in the worst case loss of P1.
Similarly, as seen in Fig. 2 b), P2 targets the components
e1 and e3 with equal probability. The best response of P1 is
then to monitor e3, leaving P2 with the lowest payoff.
Nevertheless, the set cover strategy σ1 has several favor-
able properties. Firstly, we note that by playing σ1, P1 cannot
lose more than (10). Thus, if b1 is close to n∗, the worst
case loss (10) and  approach 0, and σ1 represents a good
approximation for equilibrium monitoring strategy. If b1=n∗,
both the worst case loss (10) and  are 0, and σ1 becomes a
pure equilibrium strategy from Proposition 3. Secondly, this
strategy is easy to construct. Namely, once V ∗ is known,
one can straightforwardly find σ1 that satisfies (8) (see [7,
Lemma 1]). Although calculating V ∗ is NP–hard problem,
modern integer linear program solvers can obtain a solution
of this problem for relatively large values of n, and greedy
heuristics can be used for finding an approximations of V ∗
with performance guarantees [21]. Finally, σ1 can be further
improved in several ways, as discussed next.
C. Improving the Set Cover Monitoring Strategy
1) Increasing b1: As we already mentioned, both the
worst case loss (10) and  approach 0 when b1 approaches
n∗. Thus, an obvious way to improve σ1 is by increasing b1.
2) Focusing on highest criticality components: Assume a
situation where a group of components E¯ have criticality
wmax that is much larger compared to the criticality of
the remaining components. In Section III, we showed that
depending on b1 and the components’ criticality, P1 (resp.
P2) may focus on monitoring (resp. attacking) the compo-
nents with the highest criticality, while neglecting the others.
Let w¯max be the largest criticality among the components
E\E¯ . We show that if ∆¯w:=wmax−w¯max≥wmax b1n¯∗ , a small
modification of the strategies (8)–(9) can give us a potentially
improved -NE. Particularly, let V¯ ∗ (resp. E¯∗) be a minimum
set cover for E¯ (resp. maximum set packing of E¯), |V¯ ∗|:=n¯∗,
|E¯∗|:=m¯∗, and (σ¯1, σ¯2) be a strategy profile that satisfies
ρ¯σ1(v) =
{
b1
n¯∗ , v ∈ V¯ ∗,
0, v /∈ V¯ ∗, (13)
σ¯2(e) =
{
1
m¯∗ , e ∈ E¯∗,
0, e /∈ E¯∗. (14)
In other words, P1 (resp. P2) focuses on monitoring (resp.
targeting) the components E¯ using the strategy σ¯1 (resp. σ¯2).
The proof that (σ¯1, σ¯

2) exists is the same as for (σ

1, σ

2).
The following then holds.
Proposition 4: If ∆¯w≥wmax b1n¯∗ , then any strategy profile
that satisfies (13)–(14) is an ¯-NE of Γ, where
¯ = b1wmax
n¯∗ −max{b1, m¯∗}
n¯∗max{b1, m¯∗} .
Furthermore, for any σ2∈∆2, we have
L(σ¯1, σ2) ≤ wmax
n¯∗ − b1
n¯∗
. (15)
Proof: Assume P1 plays according to (13). If P2 attacks
e∈E¯ , we can show using the same reasoning as in the proof
of Theorem 2 that L(σ¯1, e)≤wmax n¯
∗−b1
n¯∗ =L¯. If P2 attacks
e∈E\E¯ , we have
L(σ¯1, e)
(∗)
≤ w¯max
(∗∗)
≤ wmax n¯
∗ − b1
n¯∗
= L¯,
where (*) follows from the fact that the largest loss occurs
when e is unmonitored and has criticality w¯max, and (**)
from ∆¯w≥wmax b1n¯∗ . Thus, P1 looses at most L¯ by playing
according to σ1. If P2 plays according to (14), we obtain
L(V, σ¯2) ≥ wmax
max {0, m¯∗ − b1}
m¯∗
= L,
by following the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 2.
Thus, (σ¯1, σ¯

2) is an ¯–NE with ¯ = L¯− L.
Proposition 4 has two consequences. Firstly, since n¯∗≤n∗,
the worst case loss (15) achieved with strategy σ¯1 cannot be
larger than the one given by (10). Secondly, if n¯∗=m¯∗, we
have that any strategy profile that satisfies (13)–(14) is a
NE, so σ¯1 is an equilibrium monitoring strategy.
3) Numerical approach: We now briefly explain how
CGP [20] can be used for improving the set cover monitoring
strategy σ1. We refer the interested reader to the Appendix
for more details. We begin by rewriting LP1 in the form
minimize
σ1≥0,z1≥0
z1 subject to Aσ1 + 1z1 ≥ 0, 1Tσ1 = 1, (16)
where A is a matrix representation of Γ. Note that every
element of σ1 corresponds to a possible pure strategy from
A1. Since the number of pure strategies grows quickly with
b1, we cannot directly solve (16) due to the size of decision
vector. However, the number of inequality constrains is
always m, which allow us to use CGP to solve (16).
The first step of CGP is to solve the master problem,
which is obtained from (16) by considering only a subset
A˜1 of pure strategies. Hence, to form the master problem,
we only generate columns of A that correspond to variables
A˜1, which explains the name of the procedure. In our case,
we initialize A˜1 with those pure strategies that are played
with non-zero probability once P1 employs the set cover
monitoring strategy σ1 (see [7, Lemma 1] for construction
of these strategies). Once a solution (z˜∗1 , σ˜
∗
1) of the master
problem is calculated, one solves the sub-problem
maximizeV ∈A1 (ρ
∗)TaV + pi∗, (17)
where (ρ∗, pi∗) is a dual solution of the master problem and
aV is the column of A that corresponds to a pure strategy V .
If the optimal value of (17) is negative, z˜∗1 can be decreased.
We then add a solution of (17) to A˜1, and proceed to the
next iteration. Otherwise, z˜∗1 (resp. σ˜
∗
1) is the optimal value
of the game (resp. an equilibrium monitoring strategy), and
we stop the procedure.
The key point of CGP is to be able to solve (17) efficiently,
which is not necessarily the case for every linear program.
However, in case of LP1, A is determined based on the
loss function l and has a structure that allow us to obtain
a solution and the optimal value of (17) by solving a binary
linear program. Additionally, this program has n+m binary
decision variables and m+1 constrains for any b1, so it can
be solved efficiently for relatively large values of n and m
using modern solvers. This allow us to use CGP to find
or approximate an equilibrium monitoring strategy for the
networks of relatively large size, as shown in the next section.
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Fig. 3. Time needed to calculate an equilibrium monitoring strategy using
CGP for different values of b1.
V. NUMERICAL STUDY
We now test CGP on benchmarks of large scale water
networks ky4 and ky8 [22]. These networks can be modeled
with a directed graph. The vertices of the graph model
pumps, junctions, and water tanks. The edges model pipes,
and the edge direction is adopted to be in the direction
of the water flow. We consider attacks where P2 injects
contaminants in a water network, while P1 allocates sensors
to detect contaminants. In this case, E are the locations where
contaminants can be injected, and V are the locations where
sensors can be placed. We adopt E and V to be the vertices of
the water network graph. The monitoring sets were formed as
follows: if a water flow from contamination source e passes
through v, then e belongs to Ev [23]. Criticality we in this
case can characterize the normalized population affected by
contaminants injected in e [24]. For simplicity, we generated
we randomly. We remark that n=m=964 (resp. n=m=1332)
for ky4 (resp. ky8) network.
We first measured how much time does it take to construct
the set cover monitoring strategy σ1, and to further improve
it to an equilibrium monitoring strategy using CGP. We
considered ky4 and ky8 networks, and varied b1. The results
are shown in Fig. 3. Notice that the longest running time was
1180 seconds, which demonstrates that CGP may allow us
to improve σ1 to an equilibrium monitoring strategy for the
networks of relatively large size. However, we also see that
the running time rapidly grows with b1 and the network size.
This indicates that this way of calculating an equilibrium
monitoring strategy may become inefficient if the network
size exceeds several thousand nodes.
Therefore, we also explored how much can we improve σ1
by running only a limited number of iterations of CGP. We
considered ky8 network, and adopted b1=150. As the per-
formance metric, we used the ratio d(i):=L¯(i)/L(σ∗1 , σ
∗
2),
where L¯(i) is the optimal value of the master program after
i iterations. The value L¯(i) upper bounds the value of the
game, and represents the worst case loss of P1 if she uses a
monitoring strategy obtained by running i iterations of CGP.
Hence, if d(i)=1, then L¯(i)=L(σ∗1 , σ
∗
2), and CGP recovers
an equilibrium monitoring strategy after i iterations.
The plot of d and the execution time with respect to the
number of iterations is shown in Fig. 4. Same as in the
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Fig. 4. Improving the set cover monitoring strategy σ1 by running a
limited number of CGP iterations.
previous experiment, the execution time includes the time
to construct the set cover monitoring strategy σ1. Although
initially d(0)≈2, d reaches the value 1.11 after 700 iterations.
We also indicate that the running time to achieve this
improvement was 391 seconds, which is approximately 3
times shorter compared to the time to obtain an equilibrium
monitoring strategy for b1=150. This indicates that even
if CGP may not be used to improve σ1 to an equilibrium
monitoring strategy, we can still significantly improve this
strategy by running a limited number of CGP iterations.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated a network monitoring game, with
the purpose of developing monitoring strategies. The oper-
ator’s (resp. attacker’s) goal was to deploy sensors (resp.
attack a component) to minimize (resp. maximize) the loss
function defined through the component criticality. Our anal-
ysis revealed how criticality levels impact a NE, and out-
lined some fundamental differences compared to the related
game [7]. Particularly, the operator can leave some of the
noncritical components unmonitored based on their criticality
and available budget, while the attacker does not necessarily
need to attack these components. Next, we proved that pre-
viously known strategies [7] can be used to obtain an –NE,
and showed how  depends on component criticality. Finally,
we discussed how to improve the monitoring strategy from
this -NE. It was shown that if a group of the components
have criticality level sufficiently larger then the others, the
strategy can be improved by a simple modification. We also
demonstrated that the strategy can be improved numerically
using the column generation procedure.
The future work will go into two directions. Firstly, we
plan to find the way to characterize and analyze properties
of a NE in the general case of the game. Secondly, we
intend to generalize the game model by relaxing some of the
modeling assumptions. For instance, to allow the attacker to
target several components simultaneously, and to remove the
assumption that deployed sensors are perfectly secured.
APPENDIX: COLUMN GENERATION PROCEDURE
CGP can be used to solve linear programs with a large
number of decision variables and a relatively small number
of constraints [20], such as LP1. The first step of CGP is to
solve the master problem of LP1, which can be formulated as
minimize
z˜1≥0,σ˜1≥0
z˜1
subject to
∑
V ∈A˜1
aV σ˜1(V ) + 1z˜1 ≥ 0,∑
V ∈A˜1
σ˜1(V ) = 1,
(18)
where aV ∈Rm is given by
aV (i) =
{
−wei , ei /∈ EV ,
0, ei ∈ EV .
(19)
The only difference between (18) and LP1 is that we consider
only a subset of pure actions A˜1 instead of the whole set A1.
As mentioned before, we initialize A˜1 with pure strategies
that are played with non-zero probability once P1 employs
the set cover monitoring strategy σ1 (see [7, Lemma 1] for
construction of these strategies).
Let (z˜∗1 ,σ˜
∗
1) be a solution of (18). The next step is to check
if z˜∗1 can be further decreased, which can be done by solving
the following subproblem
c˜ := minimizeV ∈A1 −
m∑
i=1
ρ∗i aV (i)− pi∗, (20)
where ρ∗∈Rm (resp. pi∗∈R) is an optimal dual solution
of (18) that corresponds to the inequality constraints (resp.
equality constraint). If c˜<0, z˜∗1 can be further decreased. We
then add a solution of (20) to A˜1, and repeat the procedure
with the new set A˜1. Yet, if c˜≥0, z˜∗1 is the optimal value of
LP1, and σ˜∗1 is an equilibrium monitoring strategy.
However, the crucial point of CGP is to find an efficient
way to solve (20). Namely, due to the large cardinality of
A1, it is not tractable to simply go through all the columns
aV and pick the optimal one. In our case, we can avoid this
by solving the following binary linear program to obtain a
solution and the optimal value of (20)
minimize
x∈{0,1}n,y∈{0,1}m
∑
ei∈E
ρ∗iweiyei − pi∗
subject to
∑
v∈V
e∈Ev
xv≥1− ye,∀e ∈ E ,
∑
v∈V
xv ≤ b1.
(21)
Note that this program has n+m binary variables and m+1
constraints regardless of b1. Therefore, modern day integer
linear program solvers can obtain a solution and the optimal
value of (18) for relatively large values of n and m. We
conclude by showing how to obtain a solution and the
optimal value of (20) by solving (21).
Lemma 2: Let c˜ (resp. x˜, y˜) be the optimal value (resp. a
solution) of (21). Let V˜ be formed as follows: if x˜v=0 (resp.
x˜v=1), then v/∈V˜ (v∈V˜ ). Then c˜ (resp. V˜ ) is the optimal
value (resp. a solution) of (20).
Proof: Firstly, note that |V˜ | ≤ b1 since x˜ has to satisfy
the second constraint of (21). Thus, V˜ is a feasible point
of (20). We now show that V˜ is a solution of (20), and that
the optimal values of (20) and (21) coincide.
Note that ρ∗≥0 as a dual solution of (18), we>0, and
the objective of (21) reduces to minimizing
∑
ei∈E ρ
∗
iweiyei .
Thus, for fixed x˜, the best way to minimize the objective
is to set as many elements of y to 0. Yet, an element yei
can be set to zero only if
∑
v∈V,ei∈Evxv≥1. This happens
once ei∈EV˜ . Otherwise, yei=1 has to hold in order for a
constraint to be satisfied. Hence, for a fixed x˜, the lowest
objective value that can be achieved over all feasible y is
c˜ =
∑
ei∈E,ei /∈EV˜
ρ∗iwei − pi∗. (22)
On the other hand, the value of the objective function
from (20) for V˜ is given by
−
∑
ei∈E
ρ∗i aV˜ (i)− pi∗
(19)
=
∑
ei∈E,ei /∈EV˜
ρ∗iwei − pi∗ (22)= c˜. (23)
From (23), it follows that the optimal value of (20) is at least
c˜. We now finalize the proof by showing that the optimal
value of (20) cannot be lower than c˜ using contradiction.
Let V ′ be a solution of (20), and assume c′<c˜. Let x′ be
constructed as follows: x′v=0 (resp. x
′
v=1) if v/∈V ′ (resp.
v∈V ′). Since |V ′|≤b1, x′ satisfies the constraints of (21).
For this x′, let y′ei=0 (resp. y
′
ei=1) if ei∈EV ′ (ei /∈EV ′ ).
This y′ also satisfies the constraints of (21), and we have∑
ei∈E
ρ∗iweiy
′
ei − pi∗ =
∑
ei∈E,ei /∈EV ′
ρ∗iwei − pi∗
(19)
=
∑
ei∈E
ρ∗i aV ′(i)− pi∗ = c′.
This contradicts the assumption that the optimal value of (21)
equals c˜, since c′<c˜. Thus, V ′ cannot exist, and c˜ (resp. V˜ )
is the optimal value (resp. a solution) of (21).
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